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I.

INTRODUCTION

With mass murders on the rise, the public demanded legislative
action to ameliorate the issue. Thus far, the legislature’s response has been
primarily comprised of gun reform proposals.1 Congress has been flooded
with bills and acts that call for stricter licensing practices, more in-depth
background checks, or bans on assault weapons and high capacity
magazines.2 However, the solution to the mass murder problem does not
likely lie within gun control, but rather, within prescription drug control.3
Antidepressant and antipsychotic medications are known to increase suicidal,
homicidal, and violent tendencies in some users.4 Individuals such as James
E. Holmes, Seung-Hui Cho, and Eric Harris were prescribed antidepressant
or antipsychotic medications.5 Afterward, these same individuals committed
the mass murders at Aurora Century movie theater, Virginia Polytechnic

* Marissa Duquette will graduate from Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center, in May 2015. Duquette would like to thank the board members and her
colleagues at the Nova Law Review for persistently working to improve and refine this article.
She would also like to thank Professors Rex Ford and Michael Richmond for their guidance
and support, as well as her family—Scott, Marie, and Rosco—for all of their dedication and
encouragement.
1.
See Jana R. McCreary, “Mentally Defective” Language in the Gun
Control Act, 45 CONN. L. REV. 813, 831 (2013).
2.
See id. at 832; JEFFREY A. ROTH & CHRISTOPHER S. KOPER, NAT’L INST. OF
JUSTICE, IMPACTS OF THE 1994 ASSAULT WEAPONS BAN: 1994–96 1 (1999).
3.
Jerome R. Corsi, Psych Meds Linked to 90% of School Shootings, WND
(Dec. 18, 2012, 10:16 PM), http://www.wnd.com/2012/12/psych-meds-linked-to-90-ofschool-shootings/; Bob Unruh, Are Meds to Blame for Cho’s Rampage?, WND (Apr. 23,
2007, 1:00 AM), http://www.WND.com/2007/04/41218.
4.
Corsi, supra note 3; Unruh, supra note 3.
5.
Corsi, supra note 3; see McCreary, supra note 1, at 823, 824 n.54.
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Institute and State University, and Columbine High School, respectively.6 A
simple analogy illustrates the point.
A drunk driver swerves off of the road and onto a crowded sidewalk,
killing some and injuring others. Nobody blames the vehicle. Legislators do
not call for sports car bans. The Department of Motor Vehicles is not
criticized for its failure to perform a more thorough background check before
issuing the driver’s license. Rather, society blames alcohol and its ability to
impair normal human functions.
Contrastingly, a drug-addled college student storms onto campus and
proceeds to slaughter thirty-two students with two semiautomatic handguns:
A Walther P22 .22 caliber and a Glock 19 9-mm.7 A sizeable number of
people blame the firearms.8 Legislators call for assault weapon bans and
high capacity magazine bans.9 The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms (“ATF”) is criticized for its inability to establish an effective
federal background check system.10 Very few people blame the college
student’s prescription medication and its ability to induce suicidal,
homicidal, and violent behavior.11
This article proposes that the gun—like the car—should not be the
subject of further regulation.12 Antidepressant and antipsychotic medications
should bear the blame for their capacity to induce violent behavior in users.13
As such, the pharmaceutical industry—not the gun industry—should be the
legislature’s focus if the mass murder problem is to be solved.14
This article begins with an overview of American gun control to
date.15 It then analyzes the legislature’s failure to curb mass shootings
through stricter gun laws.16 In doing so, the article negates two common
misconceptions: First, that gun control reduces the number of firearms in
criminal hands; and second, that a European-style ban on firearms would be
a possible and effective solution to the mass shooting problem.17 While
6.
McCreary, supra note 1, at 823–24; Corsi, supra note 3.
7.
McCreary, supra note 1, at 824, 829; see also Corsi, supra note 3; Unruh,
supra note 3.
8.
See Unruh, supra note 3.
9.
See ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 1.
10.
See Mark B. Melter, The Kids are Alright; It's the Grown-ups Who Scare
Me: A Comparative Look at Mass Shootings in the United States and Australia, 16 GONZAGA
J. INT'L L. 33, 55–56 (2012).
11.
See Corsi, supra note 3.
12.
See infra Part IV.
13.
See infra Part IV.
14.
See infra Part IV.
15.
See infra Part II.
16.
See infra Part III.
17.
See infra Part III.
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invalidating those false impressions, the article displays how increased gun
availability actually lowers mass shooting rates.18 The article then discusses
the link between mass shootings and prescription drug use and details how
such violence can actually be a treatment-induced problem.19 Finally, the
article closes with a new way for legislators to respond to the mass murder
problem.20 This involves a shift in responsibility from the gun industry to the
pharmaceutical industry by putting liability on the latter, and requiring drug
compatibility tests to be administered prior to prescribing a medication.21
II.

THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN GUN LEGISLATION

Modern gun control debates in the United States are typically
preceded by a tragic event; most often it is a mass shooting.22 However,
prior to the 1900s, gun control laws were enacted in response to slave
uprisings and were primarily aimed at keeping slaves and freedmen from
obtaining firearms.23 In 1911, New York enacted the Sullivan Law as a
response to the widely publicized shooting of novelist David Graham
Phillips.24 The Sullivan Law required that a permit be obtained before an
individual was allowed to possess or carry a handgun.25 This was among the
first major forms of gun control outside of the South.26
Prohibition in 1919 spurred alcohol smugglers and distillers to
engage in turf wars with one another, culminating in the St. Valentine’s Day
Massacre ten years later.27 Such extreme gun violence prompted legislators
to pass the National Firearms Act (“NFA”), which targeted the gangs’
weapons of choice: Machine guns and short-barreled shotguns.28 This Act
did not expressly prohibit the possession of such arms, but it did make
ownership of them financially infeasible.29 For example, the Thompson
M1928 (“Tommy Gun”)—a notoriously popular gun for smugglers and
18.
See infra Part III.
19.
See infra Part IV.
20.
See infra Part V.
21.
See infra Part V.
22.
McCreary, supra note 1, at 831; Corsi, supra note 3.
23.
David B. Kopel, The Great Gun Control War of the Twentieth Century—
and Its Lessons for Gun Laws Today, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1527, 1529 (2012).
24.
Peter Duffy, 100 Years Ago, a Killing that Spurred a Gun Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2011, at A.21; Author Phillips Shot Six Times; May Recover, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
24, 1911), http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F20911F93C5517738DDD
AD0A94D9405B818DF1D3.
25.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1529.
26.
Id.
27.
Id. at 1531.
28.
See id. at 1531, 1533.
29.
See id.
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gangsters—typically sold for around two hundred dollars in that time
period.30 The NFA placed a two hundred dollar flat tax for possessing that
gun, as well as any other machine gun or short-barreled shotgun.31 Hence,
owning a Tommy Gun after the ratification of the NFA would cost four
hundred dollars.32 Taking inflation into consideration, that is the equivalent
of $5,386.29 today, thus making possession of such a weapon practically
unachievable.33
Shortly after the NFA, Congress passed the Federal Firearms Act of
1938 (“FFA”).34 Under this Act, firearms dealers had to keep a record of all
gun sales and obtain a license before they could acquire or ship any weapon
over state lines.35 Additionally, the Act made it “unlawful for any person
who [was] convicted of a [violent crime] ‘to receive any firearm or
ammunition which had been shipped’” over state lines; as such, firearms
dealers were responsible for ascertaining that any prospective buyer had not
been previously convicted of a violent crime.36
In 1939, the NFA and the FFA were discussed in detail by the
Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Miller.37 In that case,
two defendants were charged with violating the NFA and the FFA when they
transported a sawed-off, double-barreled shotgun over state lines.38 In
response, the defendants argued that the Acts violated their Second
Amendment rights.39 Justice McReynolds, writing for the majority, found
that the Second Amendment did not protect the individual right to possess a
sawed-off double-barrel shotgun since it was not a common-use weapon and
bore no relationship to the preservation of a well-regulated militia.40
Although the Court tried to make it clear that the right to bear arms was an
individual right rather than a collective or states’ right,41 the decision in

30.
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI: A
CENTENNIAL HISTORY, 19082008 16 (2008); see BILL YENNE, TOMMY GUN: HOW GENERAL
THOMPSON’S SUBMACHINE GUN WROTE HISTORY 86 (2009).
31.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1533.
32.
See YENNE, supra note 30, at 86; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1533.
33.
See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
34.
15 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1938) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012));
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1533–34.
35.
15 U.S.C. § 902(f); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1534.
36.
15 U.S.C. § 902; United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 263 (3d Cir. 1942),
rev’d, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1534.
37.
307 U.S. 174 (1939).
38.
Id. at 175.
39.
Id. at 176.
40.
Id. at 175, 178.
41.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579–80, 592 (2008).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss2/7

4

Duquette: The Rx and the AR: A Products Liability Approach to the Mass Shoo

2014]

THE RX AND THE AR

363

Miller resulted in nationwide misinterpretation of the Second Amendment.42
One example comes from Commonwealth v. Davis,43 in which the state’s
supreme court said:
[T]he declared right to keep and bear arms is that of the people, the
aggregate of citizens; the right is related to the common defense;
and that in turn points to service in a broadly based, organized
militia.
....
[The Second Amendment] is not directed to guaranteeing the
rights of individuals, but rather, as we have said, to assuring some
freedom of State forces from national interference.44

From 1939 to 2008, courts across the United States erroneously used Miller
to justify otherwise unconstitutional restrictions on Second Amendment
rights.45
In 1967, New York City mandated long-gun registration.46
Eventually, the registry information was used to confiscate those firearms
after the city council erroneously decided that rifles and shotguns were
assault weapons.47 When federal legislators attempted to adopt New York
City’s gun registration methods, the House of Representatives amended
statutes to explicitly forbid federal agencies from compiling any information
that could be used for a national gun registry.48
The Gun Control Act of 1968 (“GCA”) slightly altered the recordkeeping requirements set forth by the FFA.49 It required firearms dealers to
record a buyer’s personal information and the gun’s identifying features such

42.
Id. at 627 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 179); United States v. Warin, 530
F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178); Stevens v. United States, 440
F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d
261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942), rev’d, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 174);
Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Mass. 1976) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 177–
78); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1550.
43.
343 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1976).
44.
Id. at 848–50.
45.
Warin, 530 F.2d at 106–07 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178); Stevens, 440
F.2d at 149 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178); Tot, 131 F.2d at 266 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at
174); Davis, 343 N.E.2d at 850 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 177–78).
46.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1541.
47.
Id.
48.
Id. at 1565–66.
49.
Id. at 1534, 1545. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(5) (2012), with 27 C.F.R.
§ 478.11 (2014).
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as its model and serial number on Form 4473 for each gun sale.50 Although
Form 4473 is a federal form, the gun sale would be registered by the dealer
and “would not be collected in a [national] registration list.”51 The pool of
civilians who were legally allowed to purchase or possess a firearm from a
licensed dealer was also the subject of GCA restrictions.52 Whereas the FFA
only prohibited gun sales to individuals convicted of a violent crime, the
GCA further prohibited gun and ammunition sales to illicit drug users and
those who were mentally defective.53
In the years following the enactment of the GCA, the phrase
mentally defective was interpreted differently by courts across the United
States.54 In 1973, the Eighth Circuit decided that a mental illness was not
synonymous to a mental defect.55 Rather, the court determined that “[a]
mental defective . . . is a person who has never possessed a normal degree of
intellectual capacity, whereas . . . an insane person[’s] faculties which were
originally normal have been impaired by [a] mental disease.”56 Therefore, in
the Eighth Circuit, individuals with a subnormal level of intelligence were
barred from owning guns, but individuals suffering from schizophrenia,
bipolar disorder, or a personality disorder were entitled to full Second
Amendment rights.57
In Huddleston v. United States,58 the Supreme Court attempted to
improve the lower courts’ ability to analyze the language of the GCA’s
prohibited persons categories.59 The Court stated that the ultimate goal of
the GCA was to keep “‘lethal weapons out of the hands of criminals, drug
addicts, mentally disordered persons, juveniles, and other persons whose
possession of them is too high a price in danger to us all to allow.’”60
Although this statement may have provided lower courts with the legislative

50.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1545; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(5).
51.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1545–46.
52.
McCreary, supra note 1, at 816.
53.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1546; McCreary, supra note 1, at 816. Compare
18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2012), with 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2014).
54.
See United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2012); United
States v. Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334, 1337 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d
1120, 1123–24 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Vertz, 102 F. Supp. 2d 787, 788 (W.D. Mich.
2000).
55.
Hansel, 474 F.2d at 1124.
56.
Id.
57.
Id. at 1125; McCreary, supra note 1, at 818 n.17, 844–45.
58.
415 U.S. 814 (1974).
59.
Id. at 823, 825.
60.
Id. at 825.
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intent behind the Act, it merely replaced the phrase mentally defective with
mentally disordered, which did little to actually clarify the definition.61
The ATF eventually revised its definition of the mentally defective
class of individuals who were not allowed to possess a firearm.62 To belong
to this class, an individual needed:
(a)
A determination by a court, board, commission, or other
lawful authority that a person, as a result of marked subnormal
intelligence, or mental illness, incompetency, condition, or disease:
(1)

Is a danger to himself or to others; or

(2)
Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own
affairs.
(b)

The term shall include—

(1)

A finding of insanity by a court in a criminal case; and

(2)
Those persons found incompetent to stand trial or found
not guilty by reason of lack of mental responsibility . . . .63

Correspondingly, there was no longer an issue as to whether mentally
defective referred to mental illness or subnormal intelligence; the term
encompassed both characteristics, and either one could disqualify an
individual from firearm possession.64 However, courts faced a new problem:
Whether commitment to a mental institution qualified as an adjudication of
mental defectiveness.65
In United States v. Giardina,66 the Fifth Circuit found that
involuntary hospitalization would not disqualify an individual from the right
to buy and possess a firearm under the statute.67 The court in United States
v. Vertz68 went even further, finding that adjudication by a probate judge that
a defendant required treatment because he was mentally ill was “not
61.
McCreary, supra note 1, at 846 (noting that courts have been known to
muddy the waters when it comes to interpreting the meaning of mentally defective). Compare
18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2012), with Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 825.
62.
27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2014).
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
See United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 47, 49 (1st Cir. 2012);
United States v. Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334, 1337 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Vertz, 102 F.
Supp. 2d 787, 791 (W.D. Mich. 2000).
66.
861 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1988).
67.
Id. at 1337.
68.
102 F. Supp. 2d 787 (W.D. Mich. 2000).
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sufficient to bring [the defendant] within the statute,” because “[t]he probate
court made no finding that [the defendant] was a danger to himself.”69
Finally, United States v. Rehlander70 established that full due process of law
was required before any individual’s Second Amendment rights could be
denied; as such, a voluntary commitment to a mental institution or a
commitment for observation would not bar an individual from buying a
firearm in the future.71 Although the ATF’s new definition was intended to
clarify the Legislature’s intent in enacting the GCA—“keeping ‘[guns] out of
the hands of . . . [those] whose possession of them is too high a price in
danger’”—it seems as though it just shifted the courts’ focus further away
from public safety concerns, and onto the Fifth Amendment rights of the
mentally ill.72
In 1986, Congress decided that “the rights of citizens to keep and
bear arms under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution . .
. require additional legislation to correct existing firearms statutes and
enforcement policies.”73 Accordingly, the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act
(“FOPA”) was made law that year.74 Originally, one of the major proposals
of the Act would have banned most of the center-fire rifle ammunition in the
United States, since Republican Mario Biaggi put forward a cop-killer bullet
ban and over-broadly defined what that would include.75 Fortunately, the
National Rifle Association made a compromise with Biaggi and modified the
text of the Act to simply “ban[] a category of ammunition that was no longer
being produced for the retail market.”76 In addition to banning certain types
of ammunition, “FOPA . . . banned the sale of new machine guns . . . to the
public,” placed restrictions on the ATF’s power, forbade federal gun
registration, and required firearms dealers to report certain gun sales directly
to the Attorney General.77 Specifically, FOPA required firearms dealers to
provide a report to the Attorney General when any one purchaser bought two
or more firearms within a five-day period.78
Although the FFA, GCA, and FOPA all specified classes of the
population that were ineligible to purchase a firearm, licensed firearms

69.
Id. at 788.
70.
666 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2012).
71.
Id. at 48–49.
72.
Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 825 (1974).
73.
Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 1, 100 Stat. 449,
449 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012)).
74.
Id.
75.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1572.
76.
Id. at 1573.
77.
§ 103, 100 Stat. at 455; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1574.
78.
§ 103, 100 Stat. at 455.
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dealers had no way of confirming a prospective buyer’s eligibility.79
Purchasers simply had to certify in writing that they were not a member of a
disqualified class—such as a convicted felon or adjudicated as mentally
defective—and the licensed dealer had to trust that this information was
true.80 Of course, ineligible individuals wishing to obtain a firearm were
inclined to falsely certify their eligibility, so in 1993, Congress attempted to
ameliorate this problem through the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act (“Brady Bill”).81
The Brady Bill mandated a five-day waiting period before a licensed
dealer could release a gun to a purchaser.82 In that five-day period, licensed
dealers collaborated with the local chief law enforcement officers, who
conducted a background check to verify the purchaser’s eligibility.83 Five
years later, the waiting period requirement expired pursuant to the terms of
the Brady Bill and was replaced with the National Instant Criminal
Background Check System (“NICS”).84 The NICS, maintained by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), cut out the chief local law
enforcement middleman and allowed firearms dealers themselves to conduct
background checks on potential buyers.85 To accommodate a prospective
gun buyer’s right to privacy, the NICS background check would only reveal
the buyer’s eligibility status, and not the reason behind it; i.e., the system
would only display ineligible rather than adjudicated as mentally defective.86
Unfortunately, even this system had its glitches.87 State agencies with
information related to a person belonging to a class of prohibited purchasers
were under very little pressure to report this information to the FBI.88
Consequently, compliance with reporting procedures was infrequent and the
NICS was rarely up to date, resulting in a prospective purchaser’s
ineligibility failing to show up on the NICS for months.89 In addition, “only
‘licensed’ importers, manufacturers, and dealers [were] federally mandated
79.
United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 263 (3d Cir. 1942), rev’d, 319 U.S.
463 (1943); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1534, 1546; McCreary, supra note 1, at 833.
80.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1546; McCreary, supra note 1, at 833–34.
81.
McCreary, supra note 1, at 834–35.
82.
Id. at 835.
83.
Id.
84.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1582–83; Melter, supra note 10, at 55.
85.
Melter, supra note 10, at 55.
86.
See McCreary, supra note 1, at 854.
87.
See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, STATE LAWS AND PUBLISHED ORDINANCES xiii–xv (31st ed. 2010–2011), available
at https://www.atf.gov/files/publications/download/p/atf-p-5300-5-31st-editiion/2010-2011atf-book-final.pdf; McCreary, supra note 1, at 837–38; Melter, supra note 10, at 55.
88.
See McCreary, supra note 1, at 835–36.
89.
See id. at 838.
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to perform background checks on weapons purchasers,” which meant that
private firearms sales—including sales at gun shows—could be conducted
legally without inquiry into a purchaser’s eligibility.90 Furthermore,
concealed carry permits and similar firearms licenses qualified as alternatives
to the background check requirements of the Brady Bill in nineteen states.91
Although a background check is almost always required in order to obtain
any sort of weapons permit, states had no federal obligation to keep permit
record information on a readily accessible database for licensed firearms
dealers to access.92
The NICS Improvement Act recognized that there were problems
with the Brady Bill’s background check requirement, but failed to correctly
identify them.93 Rather than providing incentives for state agency reporting
compliance, closing the gun show loophole, or eliminating the license
alternative to a background check, it merely required federal agencies with
any information regarding an individual’s ineligibility to “report that
information to the Attorney General . . . quarterly.”94
In 1994, the Clinton Crime Bill was enacted as a response to Patrick
Purdy’s mass murder in Stockton, California, and the intensifying turf and
drug wars conducted by gangs.95 It included one of the most irrational and
functionally inconsequential assault weapon bans in the history of American
gun control, ironically titled the Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use
Protection Act.96 The ban outlawed a mere nineteen guns by name, some of
which had already been banned since 1989.97 Of the nineteen explicitlybanned guns in the Act, there were at least twelve legal substitutes already on
the market.98 The Act also banned roughly two hundred more guns based on
“appearances [and] . . . accessories such as bayonet lugs and adjustable
stocks,” under what was called the Features Test.99
(30) The term “semiautomatic assault weapon” means—
....

90.
91.
at xiv–xv.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss2/7

Melter, supra note 10, at 55–56.
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, supra note 87,
See id.; McCreary, supra note 1, at 835.
See McCreary, supra note 1, at 837–38.
See id. at 837.
ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 1; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1585.
See ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 1; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1585–86.
ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 2–3; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1585.
ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 3.
ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 4; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1585–86.
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(B) a semiautomatic rifle that has an ability to accept a
detachable magazine and has at least [two] of—
(i) a folding or telescoping stock;
(ii) a pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously
beneath the action of the weapon;
(iii) a bayonet mount;
(iv) a flash suppressor or threaded barrel
designed to accommodate a flash suppressor; and
(v) a grenade launcher . . . .100

The Features Tests for semiautomatic pistols and shotguns were similarly
focused on aesthetics.101 The overbroad and generic nature of the Features
Test allowed firearms manufacturers to disconnect the frills, rename the
weapons, and ultimately sell guns that were “operationally the same as the
banned guns.”102 Moreover, roughly six hundred firearms, such as the Ruger
Mini-14, were explicitly exempted from the ban because of their large
ownership base even though they were “functionally identical to banned
guns like the AR-15.”103
The Act also banned the sale of high capacity magazines—defined
as “ammunition-feeding devices designed to hold more than [ten] rounds”—
but did not outlaw possession or use of them.104 As such, this ban was futile
as well because “when one considers many of the older model guns . . . such
as the AR-15 (in production since the 1960s) . . . the world-wide inventory of
ammunition magazines holding more than [ten] rounds was probably in the
tens or even hundreds of millions.”105
Paradoxically, the most notable effect of the assault weapons ban
was the influx of so-called assault weapons into civilian hands.106 While the
Act was being debated in Congress, the production of soon-to-be-banned
guns such as the Colt AR-15, SWD M-10, and TEC-9 skyrocketed.107 In
1994, 203,578 assault weapons were produced just before the ban became
100.
Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, H.R. 4296,
103d Cong. § 2(b)(30)(B) (1994).
101.
See id. § 2(b)(30)(C)–(D).
102.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1586; see ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 4.
103.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1585–86.
104.
ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 2; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1586.
105.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1586.
106.
See ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 4.
107.
Id. at 3–5.
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law later that year.108 This is in stark contrast to the annual average
production of 91,137 assault weapons from 1989 to 1993.109 Since the
market became flooded with assault weapons and high capacity magazines
just before the ban was enacted, the price of these commodities dropped
significantly the next year.110 Prior to the ban, an AR-15-type rifle sold for
anywhere between $825 and $1325; by the very next June, the price of the
same rifle had fallen to about $660.111 Although the transfer of an assault
weapon was prohibited after 1994, individuals who paid a high pre-ban price
and then “watched as their investment depreciated after the ban took effect”
were prone to sell the weapon at a discount price to an ineligible purchaser,
and then report the gun as stolen to an insurance company in order to collect
on the policy.112 In essence, the Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use
Protection Act made assault weapons more available and less expensive to
those who could not pass a NICS background check.113 Thankfully, the
assault weapon ban expired in 2004.114
The Supreme Court of the United States had a chance to discuss gun
bans—albeit a little late—in the 2008 case, District of Columbia v. Heller.115
The law at issue in the case “totally ban[ned] handgun possession in the
home” and was struck down.116 In making its decision, the Court relied on
the common use principle.117 The common use principle dictates that a
“prohibition of an entire class of arms” is unconstitutional if that class of
arms is “overwhelmingly chosen by American[s]” for a lawful use, such as
self-defense or sporting.118 Justice Scalia poignantly stated:
It is no answer to say . . . that it is permissible to ban the
possession of handguns so long as the possession of other firearms
(i.e., long guns) is allowed. . . . There are many reasons that a
citizen may prefer a handgun for home defense: It is easier to
store in a location that is readily accessible in an emergency; it
cannot easily be redirected or wrestled away by an attacker; it is
easier to use for those without the upper-body strength to lift and
108.
Id. at 6.
109.
Id.
110.
Id. at 5.
111.
See ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 3, 5.
112.
Id. at 1, 45.
113.
See Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, H.R.
4296, 103d Cong. § 2 (1994); ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 5; Melter, supra note 10, at 55–
56.
114.
H.R. 4296 § 6(2); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1604.
115.
554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008).
116.
Id. at 628, 635.
117.
Id. at 627; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1608; Melter, supra note 10, at 46.
118.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 627–28.
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aim a long gun; it can be pointed at a burglar with one hand . . . .
Whatever the reason, handguns are the most popular weapon
chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete
prohibition of their use is invalid.119

Under this common use interpretation, a future ban on semiautomatic AR15s and the like would arguably be unconstitutional as well, because they are
some of the most popularly owned guns in America.120
III.

THE PROBLEMS WITH GUN LEGISLATION

Unfortunately, the GCA and FOPA were not enough to stop Laurie
Dann from obtaining a firearm and shooting seven children in 1988.121 The
Acts were insufficient to keep Patrick Purdy from killing five children and
wounding thirty others in Stockton, California with a Kalashnikov-style
semi-automatic rifle in 1989.122 The Public Safety and Recreational
Firearms Use Protection Act did not keep Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold
from obtaining a Savage-Springfield 67H, Hi-Point 995, TEC-9, or Stevens
311D, all of which were used in 1999 to kill thirteen and wound twenty-four
others at Columbine High School.123 The NICS did not reveal that SeungHui Cho had been involuntarily committed to a mental institution, and was
thus ineligible to buy the Walther P22 and Glock 19 that he used to kill
thirty-two people at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University.124 These instances alone should indicate that gun control is not
effectively reducing mass shootings, but they are only some of the most
notable.125 As of 1976 under the GCA, until FOPA was enacted, there were
190 mass shootings and 880 victims in America.126 In the time span between
the enactment of FOPA and the Brady Bill, there were 140 mass shooting

119.
Id. at 629.
120.
EDWARD W. HILL, MAXINE GOODMAN LEVIN COLL. OF URBAN AFFAIRS,
CLEVELAND STATE UNIV. HOW MANY GUNS ARE IN THE UNITED STATES? AMERICANS OWN
BETWEEN 262 MILLION AND 310 MILLION FIREARMS 3 (2013), available at
http://www.urban.csuohio.edu/publications/hill/GunsInTheUS_Hill_032813.pdf; Kopel, supra
note 23, at 1608.
121.
See Unruh, supra note 3.
122.
See Kopel, supra note 23, at 1578; Unruh, supra note 3.
123.
Janet L. Kaminski Leduc, OLR Research Report: Weapons Used in Mass
Shootings, ST. CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/rpt/2013R-0057.htm; Unruh, supra note 3.
124.
McCreary, supra note 1, at 824, 829–30; Kaminski Leduc, supra note
123; Unruh, supra note 3.
125.
See Melter, supra note 10, at 41; Unruh, supra note 3.
126.
Melter, supra note 10, at 60.
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incidents and 620 individuals either wounded or killed.127 During the era of
the Clinton Crime Bill, 193 mass shootings occurred, leaving 875 people
either dead or injured.128 Since 2004, when the assault weapons ban ended,
there have been 178 mass shootings and 969 victims.129
Still, about twenty-four percent of the nation’s citizens believe that
tighter gun restrictions would prevent mass shootings in America.130 This is
despite the fact that countries with even more stringent gun laws than the
United States have had their fair share of mass shootings.131 England—with
a mere 6.2 guns per one hundred people—experienced a mass shooting in
2010, which claimed the lives of twelve citizens.132 Germany had “three of
the five worst school shootings worldwide over the past fifteen years,”
despite the country’s incredibly strict gun laws.133 But two instances hardly
prove the point: It could be argued that Europeans have only seen about
twelve mass public shootings and just over one hundred people killed by
gunfire, during those shootings, since 2001, which is notably less than what
Americans have experienced in the same time frame.134 It is worthy of note,
however, that although the number of mass shooting incidents in Europe is
less than that in America, the number of mass murders is roughly the same;
perpetrators simply resort to bombs and arson instead of firearms.135
Even supposing that the prevalence of guns in the United States is to
blame for mass shootings, gun bans have proved ineffective in the past and
government seizures of firearms would be just as unsuccessful in reducing
gun availability.136 There are between 262 and 310 million firearms
privately owned in America.137 Guns are not registered or tracked, so there
is no reliable way for the government to hunt down and seize each one.138
Furthermore, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, gun owners would need to
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 60–61; MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS, ANALYSIS OF RECENT
MASS SHOOTINGS 6–23 (2013), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/
NEWS/A_U.S.%20news/US-news-PDFs/Analysis_of_Mass_Shootings.pdf.
130.
Melter, supra note 10, at 42; Amy Roberts, By the Numbers: Guns in
America, CNN (Aug. 9, 2012, 1:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/09/politics/btn-gunsin-america.
131.
Melter, supra note 10, at 42–43.
132.
Id. at 43.
133.
Id.
134.
Id. at 43–44, 60–61 tbl.1.
135.
See “Assault Weapons,” GUNCITE, http://www.guncite.com/gun_control_
gcassaul.html (last updated Oct. 24, 2010); see also Melter, supra note 10, at 42, 44, 60–61
tbl.1.
136.
See Melter, supra note 10, at 46–47, 49–51.
137.
HILL, supra note 120, at 2.
138.
Id.
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be adequately compensated if the government chose to confiscate their
property.139 This would require “hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars,”
which is simply not in national or states’ budgets.140 Hence, it is highly
unlikely that gun owners would receive even half of the fair market value of
their firearms, let alone a single penny for their ammunition and add-ons.141
Even if government agencies were able to confiscate fifty percent of the guns
in the United States—with adequate compensation to the owners—over 100
million guns would still remain.142 Against those numbers, it is difficult to
imagine that a potential mass shooter would have any trouble gaining access
to a firearm.143 As such, a government seizure of guns in America would be
operationally impossible, financially impracticable, constitutionally
impermissible, and ultimately ineffective.144
Contrary to popular belief, research shows that the overwhelming
presence of firearms actually has a deterrent effect on mass shooters.145 As
one author noted, “mass shootings rarely take place within the hunting aisles
of Wal-Mart or at the local shooting range.”146 In fact, “mass shooter[s]
[almost] always pick a location in which” law-abiding citizens will not be
armed, such as a school or a place of worship.147 Conversely, areas where
citizens can lawfully carry a concealed handgun are sixty-seven percent less
likely to experience a mass-shooting incident.148 This is primarily because
armed civilians are not suitable prey—they possess the ability to neutralize
the shooter—and mass shooters are looking for a target, not a duel.149 In
light of this, Americans may want to think twice before they blame mass
shootings on the prevalence of firearms.150
IV.

THE LINK TO ANTIDEPRESSANT AND ANTIPSYCHOTIC USE

Mass shooters have more in common than the fact that they all—by
definition—used a firearm to effectuate death and injury.151 This has led
139.
U.S. CONST. amend. V; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1564.
140.
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1564.
141.
Id. at 1564–65.
142.
Melter, supra note 10, at 51.
143.
Id.
144.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; HILL, supra note 120, at 2, 8 figs.4 & 5
(noting the sheer number of households that contain a firearm); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1564;
Melter, supra note 10, at 49–51.
145.
Melter, supra note 10, at 41–42.
146.
Id. at 53.
147.
Id.
148.
Id. at 42.
149.
See id. at 41.
150.
See Melter, supra note 10, at 41.
151.
See id.
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authors and researchers to propose alternatives to gun control that could be
used to arrive at an actual solution to the mass murder problem.152 For
instance, most mass shooters have a documented history of mental illness.153
Hence, numerous researchers have proposed that gun buyers should be
required to provide firearms vendors with a certificate guaranteeing the
buyer’s mental health.154
While this seems like a viable solution to the mass shooter problem,
it suffers from the exact same flaws as previous gun control legislation, but
with more of a negative economic impact.155 Looking at the mental health
certificate idea objectively, it is plain to see that it is just an additional form
of permit or background check that gun purchasers would need to supply.156
Firearms dealers would still have the burden of verifying the certificate’s
authenticity, and states would still be under no obligation to keep records in a
readily searchable database in order to facilitate verification; in fact, as seen
with the NICS, states are sometimes reluctant to comply even when they are
urged to supply records for a federal database.157 Prospective gun buyers
without insurance might not be able to afford the doctor’s visit, and
therefore, they would be denied their Second Amendment rights purely
because of their economic status.158 If Medicare or Medicaid covered the
cost of the doctor’s visit for those without adequate funds, then the alreadystrained federal budget would be put under even more stress.159
Furthermore, the mental health certificate may rely on the opinion of a single
doctor, which may not always be accurate.160 Even if accurate, the practice
of denying Second Amendment rights to those diagnosed as mentally ill
would be constitutionally impermissible because those individuals would not
have received due process of law before their rights were stripped.161
Essentially, there are too many problems with the mental health certificate
idea for it to be a viable solution.162
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 56; McCreary, supra note 1, at 855.
See Unruh, supra note 3.
McCreary, supra note 1, at 855; Melter, supra note 10, at 56.
See McCreary, supra note 1, at 855–57.
Id. at 855.
Id. at 838, 856.
See U.S. CONST. amend. II; McCreary, supra note 1, at 838, 856.
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND
MEDICARE ON THE FEDERAL BUDGET 1 (2002), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/
files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/39xx/doc3982/11-14-longrangebrief6.pdf; McCreary, supra note 1, at
857.
160.
See McCreary, supra note 1, at 827 (noting that Cho was released from a
mental health facility after one doctor said that he was not a danger to himself or others).
161.
United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2012).
162.
E.g., McCreary, supra note 1, at 857.
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Fortunately, the fact that many mass shooters had a documented
mental illness means that they have yet another characteristic in common:
Most of them sought—or were forced to undergo—treatment from a
physician or psychiatrist.163 Similarly, the treatments offered to these mass
shooters were comparable in the sense that they were all antidepressant or
antipsychotic medications.164 For example: Laurie Dann, on Anafranil and
Lithium, opened fire on seven children in 1988, killing one;165 Patrick Purdy,
prescribed Thorazine and Amitriptyline, killed five children and wounded
thirty others with an AK-47 assault rifle in 1989;166 that same year, Joseph T.
Wesbecker gunned down twenty of his coworkers just a month after he
began taking Prozac;167 unnamed “‘prescription medications related to the
treatment of psychological problems”’ were found in Seung-Hui Cho’s
possession just after his shooting rampage at Virginia Tech left thirty-two
dead;168 finally, James Eagan Holmes was prescribed sertraline—a generic
form of Zoloft—and Clonazepam shortly before he began stockpiling
firearms and ammunition for his 2012 massacre in Aurora, Colorado;169 and
those are just to name a few. Thus, this pattern is a factor that cannot be
ignored when trying to solve the mass shooting problem in America.170
The availability of antipsychotics and antidepressants has been
steadily increasing since the 1950s, with more than twenty types being
introduced to the market since then.171 The number of Americans on
antidepressants has doubled every ten years since the 1970s, and today,
roughly ten percent of Americans are prescribed at least one of these
drugs.172 There are four popular types of antidepressants: Tricyclics,
163.
Id. at 825; Unruh, supra note 3; Jenny Deam, James Holmes’ Psychiatrist
Warned He May Pose Threat, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/
04/nation/la-na-james-holmes-documents-20130405.
164.
See Corsi, supra note 3; Unruh, supra note 3.
165.
Unruh, supra note 3.
166.
Robert Reinhold, Killer Depicted as Loner Full of Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
20, 1989, at A.8; Unruh, supra note 3.
167.
Ronald Smothers, Disturbed Past of Killer of 7 Is Unraveled, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 1989, at 1.10; Unruh, supra note 3.
168.
Corsi, supra note 3.
169.
McCreary, supra note 1, at 823; Deam, supra note 163.
170.
See Corsi, supra note 3. Approximately “[ninety] percent of school
shoot[ers]” were prescribed these drugs. Id.
171.
Bruce L. Saltz et al., Recognizing and Managing Antipsychotic Drug
Treatment Side Effects in the Elderly, 14 PRIMARY CARE COMPANION J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
14, 14 (Supp. 2 2004), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC487007/
pdf/i1523-5998-6-52-14.pdf.
172.
Unruh, supra note 3; William Weir, Hartford Firm’s Genetic Tests Help
Identify Effective Antidepressants for Individual Patients, COURANT (Dec. 29, 2011), http://
articles.courant.com/2011-12-29/health/hc-hartford-hospital-depression-0102-20111229_1_
antidepressants-dna-analysis-genomas.
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monoamine oxidase inhibitors (“MAOIs”), selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors (“SSRIs”), and serotonin and norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors
(“SNRIs”).173 Popular SSRI brand names include Prozac, Paxil, Celexa, and
Zoloft, whereas popular SNRIs are marketed under names such as Effexor
and Cymbalta.174 SSRIs and SNRIs are more popular than tricyclics and
MAOIs because they are newer, and, in comparison, users may have a
decreased risk of developing long-term involuntary movement disorders.175
However, patients react to drugs differently and “no one-size-fits-all
approach to medication exists.”176
Doctors and patients have to conduct trial-and-error experiments
with different psychoactive drugs and different dosages in order to
“maximize relief while minimizing side effects.”177 This is because
antipsychotics and the four most popular categories of antidepressants are
metabolized in the human body by two enzymes: Cytochromes P2D6 and
P2C19 (“CYP2D6” and “CYP2C19”).178 The body’s production of these
enzymes determines how an individual will react to psychoactive
medications.179 Accordingly, if a patient’s body naturally produces high
amounts of CYP2D6 or CYP2C19, then the patient will metabolize an
antidepressant such as Prozac very quickly, the drug will only effect the
patient minimally, and only for a short amount of time.180 Conversely, if a
patient’s body does not produce enough of these enzymes, then a normal
dose of the psychoactive drug will cause the active ingredient to build up in
the patient’s system.181 Such an accumulation of the drug in the human body
causes serious side effects.182
173.
117 AM. JUR. Trials § 1 (2010).
174.
Id.
175.
Id.; Jack J. Chen, Drug-Induced Movement Disorders: A Primer, U.S.
PHARMACIST (Nov. 19, 2007), http://www.uspharmacist.com/content/c/10205/?+=alzheimer’s
_and_dementia,neurology.
176.
Trials, supra note 173, § 1.
177.
Id.
178.
What is CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?,
CEPMED, https://cepmed.dnadirect.com/grc/patient-site/psychiatric-drug-response/index.html
(last visited Feb. 16, 2014); see also Weir, supra note 172.
179.
See Sara Hoffman Jurand, Lawsuits Over Antidepressants Claim the Drug
Is Worse than the Disease, TRIAL, Mar. 2003, at 14, 16–17; see also M.J. Kuhar & A.R. Joyce,
Is the Onset of Psychoactive Drug Effects Compatible with a Protein-Synthesis Mechanism?,
28 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 94, 94–95 (Supp. 2003), available at http://
www.nature.com/npp/journal/v28/n1s/pdf/1300140a.pdf; What is CYP2D6 and CYP2C19
Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, supra note 178.
180.
What is CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?,
supra note 178.
181.
Jurand, supra note 179, at 16–17.
182.
Id.
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The side effects experienced by poor metabolizers can range
anywhere from nausea and dizziness to aggression and violence.183
Akathisia is a reported side effect of psychoactive drug use that is
characterized by “a terrible inner sensation of agitation accompanied by a
compulsion to move about.”184 Patients experiencing akathisia often
“describe it as wanting to ‘jump out of their skin.’”185 This condition has
been known to trigger violent behavior and drive patients to commit suicide
and homicide.186
Nevertheless, pharmaceutical manufacturers insist that akathisia is
not a side effect at all:
“[P]atients taking [antidepressants and
antipsychotics] suffer from clinical depression—and . . . depressed people
can be suicidal.”187 However, doctors often prescribe these drugs for medical
conditions other than depression, and with good reason.188 Zoloft alone has
been approved by the FDA as suitable for treating panic disorder, pediatric
OCD, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, and social anxiety disorder, to name
a few.189 Patients who received psychoactive drugs as a treatment for
ailments such as these, and showed no homicidal or suicidal behaviors prior
to taking the medication, suddenly committed violent acts up to and
including homicide.190 For example, Vicky Jo Hartman received Zoloft from
a family doctor despite the fact that “[s]he was not diagnosed with—or even
evaluated for—clinical depression, anxiety attacks, or any other
psychological disorder.”191 After a short period of taking the medication as
directed, Vicky shot her husband and then committed suicide.192
Furthermore, in spite of the confident facade that pharmaceutical companies
183.
John Alan Cohan, Psychiatric Ethics and Emerging Issues of
Psychopharmacology in the Treatment of Depression, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
115, 122–23, 149 (2003); see Corsi, supra note 3; Unruh, supra note 3; What is CYP2D6 and
CYP2C19 Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, supra note 178.
184.
Unruh, supra note 3.
185.
Jurand, supra note 179, at 14.
186.
Id.; Corsi, supra note 3; Unruh, supra note 3; see Geoffrey Ingersoll, The
Antipsychotic Prescribed to Adam Lanza Has a Troubled History All Its Own, BUS. INSIDER
(Dec. 18, 2012, 2:36 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/adam-lanza-taking-antipsychoticfanapt-2012-12.
187.
Stephanie Francis Cahill, Luvox Lawsuit: Columbine Survivor Claims
Antidepressant Caused Gunman’s Actions, A.B.A. J. Sept. 13, 2001, available at Westlaw, 1
No. 35 ABA J. E-Report 2; Jurand, supra note 179, at 14.
188.
See Jurand, supra note 179, at 16.
189.
Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Liability of Prescription Drug
Manufacturer for Drug User’s Suicide or Attempted Suicide, 45 A.L.R. 6th 385, 402 (2009).
190.
See Estates of Tobin v. SmithKline Beecham Pharm., 164 F. Supp. 2d
1278, 1280, 1283–84 (D. Wyo. 2001); Jurand, supra note 179, at 14; Corsi, supra note 3.
191.
Jurand, supra note 179, at 14.
192.
Id.
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put up—that the disease is to blame, not the drug—Solvay Pharmaceuticals
settled with Columbine victims after it was alleged that Luvox caused Eric
Harris’s high school rampage in 1999.193 In another case, the manufacturer
of Paxil was found liable in a wrongful death suit in excess of six million
dollars after expert testimony revealed that some individuals experience
severe reactions to SSRIs such as Paxil and Prozac, that the shooter was one
such individual, and that his ingestion of Paxil caused his homicidal and
suicidal behavior.194 Instances such as these are evidence that homicidal and
suicidal tendencies are not always a symptom of a pre-existing mental
illness, but are sometimes a treatment-induced problem.195
Despite the increasingly clear connection between psychoactive drug
use and akathisia-related side effects, it was not until 2006 that the Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”) even considered requiring the warning labels
to include these risks.196 Still, the failure to adequately warn about suicidal
and homicidal tendencies has been the main source of litigation against
pharmaceutical companies in recent years.197 Much of this litigation has
proved to be unsuccessful for the plaintiffs for a few reasons.198
According to Comment k in Section 402A of the Second
Restatement of Torts, there are some products—such as antidepressants and
antipsychotics—that are unavoidably unsafe.199
Unavoidably unsafe
products are those that have the potential to pose a serious risk to users even
if the product is used as directed.200 Manufacturers of products that fall
under the meaning of Comment k are generally exempted from strict liability
in suits for injuries related to the use of the product.201 Manufacturers are
able to put unavoidably unsafe products—such as psychoactive
medications—on the market as long as the medication is not unreasonably
dangerous.202 A product is only unreasonably dangerous when its benefits

193.
Taylor v. Solvay Pharm. Inc., 223 F.R.D. 544, 549 (D. Colo. 2004);
Cahill, supra note 187.
194.
Estates of Tobin, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1280, 1283–84, 1290.
195.
Cahill, supra note 187; see Corsi, supra note 3.
196.
Trials, supra note 173, § 5.
197.
Id. §§ 1, 5; Cahill, supra note 187; Jurand, supra note 179, at 14.
198.
Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of
Learned-Intermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R. 5TH 1, 26–27 (1998); Rosenhouse, supra note 189,
at 396–97.
199.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965); Trials, supra
note 173, § 10.
200.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k; Trials, supra note 173,
§ 10.
201.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k; Trials, supra note 173,
§ 10.
202.
Trials, supra note 173, § 10.
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fail to outweigh its risks.203 Since the medical utility of an antipsychotic or
antidepressant is so great, pharmaceutical manufacturers are rarely held
liable for putting an unavoidably unsafe product on the market.204 As such,
they can usually only be held liable for injury resulting from use of their
product when they failed to provide an adequate warning.205
In order to be sufficient, the warning label on psychoactive drug
packaging “must: (1) indicate the scope of the danger, (2) communicate the
extent or seriousness of the potential danger, (3) alert a reasonably prudent
practitioner to the danger, and (4) be conveyed in a satisfactory manner.”206
The third adequate warning requirement brings up a problem known as the
learned-intermediary doctrine (“LID”).207
The LID functions as a major obstacle to plaintiffs asserting a failure
to warn claim against pharmaceutical manufacturers.208 Under the LID, a
pharmaceutical manufacturer has no duty to warn a patient of possible side
effects.209 Rather, the manufacturer is only obligated to warn the medical
practitioners who will be prescribing the drug.210 The LID applies to claims
in strict liability and negligence, and it is used to break the chain of causation
between the pharmaceutical manufacturer and the drug-induced violence of
the patient.211 The rationale behind the LID is that the “physician is in the
best position to evaluate the often complex information provided by the
manufacturer concerning the risks and benefits of its drug . . . and to make an
individualized medical judgment, based on the patient’s particular needs and
susceptibilities, as to whether the patient should use the product.”212 In order
to prove that a drug was not accompanied by a sufficient warning, a doctor,
qualified as an expert, must testify that had a stronger warning been given, he
would not have prescribed the drug to his patient.213 This requirement
almost always sets the plaintiff up for failure, and the reason why is clear
when one considers the abovementioned information about CYP2D6 and
CYP2C19.214 Under the current scheme, doctors do not test a patient’s rate
203.
Id.
204.
Id.
205.
Id.
206.
Kane, supra note 198, at 29.
207.
Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 397.
208.
Kane, supra note 198, at 26; Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 397.
209.
Kane, supra note 198, at 27; Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 397.
210.
Kane, supra note 198, at 27; Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 397.
211.
Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 397.
212.
Kane, supra note 198, at 26.
213.
Id. at 30–31.
214.
See Trials, supra note 173, § 16; Jurand, supra note 179, at 16–18; Kuhar
& Joyce, supra note 179, at 94–95; Weir, supra note 172; What is CYP2D6 and CYP2C19
Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, supra note 178.
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of enzyme production prior to prescribing an antipsychotic or
antidepressant.215 They operate under the assumption that every patient’s
body has a normal level of CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 and will thus be capable
of metabolizing the drugs properly.216 Since violent akathisia-related side
effects do not occur when a drug is metabolized properly, doctors are
justified in prescribing a medication—regardless of the known possible side
effects—because a patient with normal CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 levels is
statistically unlikely to suffer them.217 As such, physicians typically cannot
testify that a stronger warning would have deterred them from prescribing a
drug to a particular patient because it is not the content of the warning that
has the most effect on their decision, but the probability that the warning’s
content will occur.218
If a doctor is capable of providing the necessary testimony in a
failure to warn claim, the plaintiff’s next major obstacle is the
pharmaceutical company’s federal preemption defense.219 Since the failure
to warn is a state law cause of action, pharmaceutical companies are inclined
to argue that “the federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive as to leave no
room for supplementary state regulation, or state law conflicts with federal
law, making compliance with both either impossible or frustrating to the
purpose of the federal law.”220 In cases such as these, the pharmaceutical
companies insist that the FDA regulations create “both a floor and a ceiling
for drug labeling” requirements.221 Under this theory, which was the
common understanding of FDA regulations until 2008, pharmaceutical
companies were discouraged from strengthening their warnings above what
was required for FDA compliance.222 This was intended to reduce the risk of
over-warning, because over-warning would “exaggerate [the drug’s] risk[] . .
. to avoid liability,” which could “discourage [the] appropriate use of a
beneficial drug” or “cause meaningful risk information to lose its
significance.”223

215.
See Jurand, supra note 179, at 16–17 (noting that a test exists and
implying that it is not used); Weir, supra note 172.
216.
See Jurand, supra note 179, at 16; Weir, supra note 172; but see What is
CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, supra note 178.
217.
Kuhar & Joyce, supra note 179, at 94–95; Weir, supra note 172; What is
CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, supra note 178.
218.
See Trials, supra note 173, § 16.
219.
Id. § 4; Kane, supra note 198, at 31; Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 400–
01.
220.
Kane, supra note 198, at 127.
221.
Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 401.
222.
Id. at 396–97, 399, 401, 403.
223.
Id. at 401.
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However, some courts have noted that the federal regulations
imposed by the FDA do not always preempt a state law cause of action
against pharmaceutical manufacturers.224 One such case was Tucker v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp.,225 which involved a wrongful death claim
against the manufacturer of the antidepressant Paxil.226 In that case, the court
analyzed the language of the federal statutes that govern changes to a
psychoactive drug’s warning label.227 The court noted that “the FDA
regulations allow a manufacturer to modify pharmaceutical labels
unilaterally and immediately, without prior FDA approval, when the
manufacturer has reasonable evidence of a serious hazard.”228
[T]he ongoing ability, authority, and responsibility to strengthen a
label still rest squarely with the drug manufacturer. . . . [T]he
FDA’s power to disapprove does not make the manufacturer’s
voluntarily strengthened label a violation of federal law, which is
what it would take to establish an actual conflict between state tort
law and federal law.229

Many cases after Tucker have followed a similar line of reasoning, finding
that a pharmaceutical manufacturer has the duty to revise its warning label as
soon as a possible risk is brought to light.230 Rather, the manufacturer’s duty
to warn is dependent on the risks that it has reason to know about, and it is
under a continuous obligation to notify prescribing physicians of any
possible side effects that could possibly be related to the drug’s use.231 A
causal relationship between the drug’s use and the purported risk does not
need to be established in order for the duty to warn to apply.232
Although a causal relationship need not be shown in order for the
manufacturer to have the duty to warn, causation is a key element that
plaintiffs need to prove at trial.233 The causation element is another large
problem in failure to warn cases, because it requires the plaintiff to show that
the suicide, homicide, or other event would not have occurred if the patient
was not prescribed the medication.234 Since pharmaceutical manufacturers
224.
E.g., Tucker v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1237–
38 (S.D. Ind. 2008).
225.
596 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (S.D. Ind. 2008).
226.
Id. at 1226–27.
227.
Id. at 1227–29.
228.
Id. at 1227.
229.
Id. at 1229.
230.
Trials, supra note 173, § 21.
231.
See id.
232.
Id. § 5.
233.
Id. §§ 5, 16.
234.
Id. § 16.
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are typically the only party with access to information about a drug’s ability
to actually cause suicidal and homicidal behavior in patients, the plaintiff
often has trouble establishing the required showing of causation.235
V.

THE SOLUTION

In recent years, biomedical companies have been investing in
pharmacogenetic studies, the results of which “offer[] the promise of
‘personalized medicine.’”236 Pharmacogenetics is the study of differences in
drug metabolism and response due to differing levels of enzyme
production.237 Pharmacogeneticists recognize that some individuals are
chemically incompatible with—or poor metabolizers of—certain prescription
drugs.238 As a result, pharmacogeneticists have developed a simple test,
which allows a physician to determine the CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 levels in
a patient’s body.239 This compatibility test begins with a cheek swab, and
after two days, a prescribing doctor is able to tell whether a patient will
experience adverse side effects if prescribed a certain type of medication.240
According to pharmacogenetic researchers, “[t]he solution . . . is to assess
enzyme activity and then prescribe medication compatible with that . . .
activity.”241 Accordingly, the compatibility test is intended to ensure that
individuals suffering from psychosis, depression, anxiety, or other
psychological disease will receive a medication that will work with their
body chemistry.242 Administering the test to patients prior to prescribing an
antipsychotic or antidepressant will reduce the likelihood that a patient will
experience violent, homicidal, and suicidal side effects.243
The proposal, then, is to require pharmaceutical companies to
provide physicians and psychiatrists with the means necessary to conduct
one of these tests for each patient who may need a psychoactive medication.
If less people suffer from akathisia-related side effects, then there is a
decreased likelihood that individuals will engage in mass shootings.244
235.
See Trials, supra note 173, § 20.
236.
Weir, supra note 172.
237.
See id.
238.
See id.
239.
Jurand, supra note 179, at 16–17; Weir, supra note 172; What is CYP2D6
and CYP2C19 Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, supra note 178.
240.
Weir, supra note 172.
241.
Id.
242.
See Jurand, supra note 179, at 16–17; Weir, supra note 172; What is
CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, supra note 178.
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See Jurand, supra note 179, at 16–17; Weir, supra note 172; What is
CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, supra note 178.
244.
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The financial burden of providing the compatibility tests should not
fall squarely on the doctors or medical facilities for a few reasons. First,
medical facilities such as hospitals, doctors’ offices, mental institutions, and
psychiatrists’ offices are under a huge financial burden as it is.245 Their
budgets should not be put under additional stress, especially because
requiring them to foot the bill for the compatibility test could have a negative
impact on patient treatment: If the medical institution is required to foot the
bill for the compatibility test, then doctors may be convinced to avoid
prescribing psychoactive drugs in order to save the facility money. This
would be an undesired effect, as it may result in patients not receiving the
treatment they need. Putting the cost of providing the test on the prescribing
physician or the medical facility could also cause doctors to continue
prescribing psychoactive drugs, but simply not administer the test in an effort
to save money. If akathisia-related side effects in the patient occurred
thereafter, then the doctor could lose his or her license and be held civilly
liable to the patient.246 This would be yet another undesired effect. Instead,
putting the cost of the compatibility tests on the pharmaceutical
manufacturers easily avoids these issues.
Second, it is a standard principle of tort law that the duty to warn
falls on the party with the most information available about the product,
which is the manufacturer.247 The compatibility test is no more than a tool
that establishes a personalized warning for each patient by providing the
statistical likelihood of adverse side effects on the user.248 Therefore, the
duty of providing the test or warning should fall on the manufacturer.249
Third, this proposal complies with FDA regulations regarding manufacturersupplied warnings, because there is no federal law explicitly prohibiting
pharmaceutical companies from providing the statistical likelihood that an
individual patient will experience side effects.250
Finally, this proposal serves as a way around the often-troubling
LID: If pharmaceutical companies were required to provide compatibility
tests to medical practitioners in order to satisfy the adequate warning
requirement and they failed to do so, then doctors could testify that they
245.
Parija Kavilanz, Doctors Driven to Bankruptcy, CNN MONEY (Apr. 8,
2013, 11:20 AM), http://www.money.cnn.com/2013/04/08/smallbusiness/doctors-bankruptcy/.
246.
See Trials, supra note 173, § 20; Peter Eisler & Barbara Hansen, Six
Types of Misconduct that Get Doctors in Trouble, USA TODAY (Aug. 21, 2013, 1:29 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/08/20/troubled-doctors-misconductfindings/2678511/.
247.
Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 405.
248.
See Weir, supra note 172.
249.
See Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 405.
250.
Id. at 396–97.
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would not have prescribed the drug if they knew that the patient was a poor
metabolizer. Currently, doctors, patients, and shooting victims bear the risk
of loss for injury when akathisia-related side effects occur.251 This proposal
places the risk of loss onto pharmaceutical manufacturers instead because
they are in a better position to financially handle “the loss by distributing it
as a cost of doing business.”252 Ultimately, this proposal opens the door for
pharmaceutical company liability.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Mass shootings in America are not going to be stopped by simple
gun regulations.253 The failures of previous gun laws and the sheer number
of mass shootings that occurred during America’s strictest gun control eras
should testify to that point.254 Government-sponsored gun buy-backs, future
gun bans, and mental health certificates are not viable solutions either
because of their inherent unconstitutionality and impracticability.255 When it
comes to mass shootings, gun restrictions are analogous to treating a
symptom; it is never going to cure the disease because it does not target the
root cause.256 Instead, if Americans wish to find a solution to the massshooting problem, they need to focus on targeting the source of mass
shooters’ suicidal and homicidal proclivities.257 One such source is akathisia
as a result of psychoactive drug use.258 Accordingly, the best way to reduce
the likelihood of mass shootings is to reduce the likelihood that patients will
suffer from akathisia after taking a prescription medication.259 One way to
help ensure that this side effect will not occur is by conducting a simple
compatibility test to determine the patients’ ability to metabolize
psychoactive drugs.260 The compatibility test requirement also makes the
pharmaceutical companies vulnerable to civil suit.261
The doors for pharmaceutical company liability need to be opened
when it is discovered that a mass shooter was using that company’s drug, and
rightly so. If it is discovered that an antipsychotic or antidepressant was
being used by a mass shooter at the time of the massacre in question, then
251.
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253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
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pharmaceutical companies should bear some risk of liability. This will
undoubtedly help the survivors and the families of the deceased. Typically,
these individuals cannot recover from the shooter because he is either dead—
shot by the police or committed suicide at the scene—or because he is not
financially capable of adequately compensating his victims. The victims
cannot recover from gun manufacturers under the current regulatory scheme
because they are immune from suit in these circumstances.262 Survivors and
the families of the deceased cannot recover from the owner of the shooting’s
location because they would have to prove that the owner knew or should
have known that this venue would be the place of an attack and he failed to
hire security accordingly, which oftentimes requires a previous, similar
violent instance at that location.263 Opening liability on the pharmaceutical
companies gives the victims a chance to recover damages, have their medical
expenses covered, or have their loved ones’ funeral service paid for. It will
also help because it will encourage the pharmaceutical companies to
independently—on their own time and dime—work toward reducing the
likelihood of their product causing a violent event.
Aside from lifting the burden off of the gun industry, saving money
on ineffectual gun legislation attempts, helping to reduce the mass shooting
problem, and assisting victims in their struggle to recover, this solution also
secures the rights of those suffering from mental illness. With the
compatibility test administered, these individuals do not have to suffer
through a trial-and-error method of treatment; it is likely that they will get
the most effective medication for their ailment the very first try—the best
possible treatment for their illness—thus securing their right to
comprehensive mental health care. Further, this solution will assist in
securing the Second Amendment rights of all American citizens—regardless
of their health—because it does not impose additional disqualifiers for
firearm ownership, nor does it mandate additional certifications or checks.

262.
See Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Case for Gun Liability Laws, NATION
(Sept. 24, 2013, 9:42 AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/176317/case-gun-liability-laws#.
263.
Deborah J. La Fetra, A Moving Target: Property Owners’ Duty to
Prevent Criminal Acts on the Premises, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 409, 409–10 (2006).
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